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By John Harrison 
Re-reading the new regionalism: A sympathetic critique 
This paper provides a sympathetic critique of the new regionalism – currently 
one of the leading debates taking place in English speaking human geography. By 
unpacking the new regionalism from its dual origins in economic geography and 
political science, I engage with some of its inherent lines of weakness by: (i) 
developing a critique arguing that it is inappropriate on the part of the new 
regionalism to neglect the role of the state in the resurgence of regions in the 
reconstituted capitalist space economy; (ii) exploring the accusation that the new 
regionalism has become enmeshed in multifaceted scalar politics and associated 
tangled policy hierarchies; and, (iii) arguing that through policy-transfer programmes, 
path-dependency, social capital, and soft institutionalism, the new regionalism has 
been constructed on inadequate foundations. Finally, in developing this sympathetic 
theoretical and methodological critique towards the new regionalism, this paper 
speculates how new regionalists should actually go about ‘doing’ regional regulation. 
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Increasingly within economic geography – and more specifically the new 
regionalism – there is a growing acknowledgement that the successful regional 
Re-Reading the New Regionalism: A Sympathetic Critique 
 
“The New Regionalism “is a set of stories about how parts of a regional 
economy might work, placed next to a set of policy ideas which might just be 
useful in some cases” (Lovering, 1999: 384 emphasis original).  
 
Since the mid-1990s there has been a discernible shift towards a ‘strong 
institutionalist’ literature seeking to locate localised processes within a global context. 
Indeed, it has recently been suggested that there is a need to “consider the nation-state 
in relation to its scalar manifestations” in order to navigate a path away from the 
fixation of processes and events at particular scales (Jones, 2001: 1202). 
The resurgence of the region as an object of investigation, and the institutional 
approach to understanding (Martin, 2000) within institutional perspectives has sought 
to critically investigate the dynamisms and mechanisms of this phenomena. Under the 
titles of ‘regional political economy’ (Agnew, 2000; MacLeod, 2000) and the ‘new 
regionalism’ (Amin, 1999) there has been a greater critical engagement with accounts 
of an economic resurgence of regions within an increasingly globalised arena. In 
particular, new regionalists go so far as to claim that contemporary capitalism and its 
territorial configuration are best regulated and governed in and through the 
decentralisation of socio-economic decision-making and associated policy 
implementation to sub-national institutional frameworks and supports (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1994; Florida, 1995; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998). In making this claim for the 
new regionalism, however, we need to be clear that this does not in any way deny that 
the state has a critical role to play in the regulation of contemporary capitalist 
societies. 
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economies which have grown rapidly in many parts of North America and Western 
Europe have been supported by a set of unique and very specific local social 
conditions. Of course, the very acknowledgement that place specificity and unique 
local conditions are key to this opens up serious questions regarding the applicability 
of theoretical generalisations within the new regionalism.  
Largely preoccupied by the angst created by Lovering’s hard-edge and 
negative critique, I would argue that the new regionalism has been deterred and 
distracted from serious regional theoretical analysis. Lovering’s scepticism towards 
the new regionalism is premised upon a line of attack, which is at best misplaced and 
at its worst, naive. By attempting to use a simplistic peripheral empirical case study 
(illustrated from the case of Wales) to wholly dismiss empirical case studies in 
regions such as Baden-Württemberg and Silicon Valley is theoretically guilty by 
association. By dropping his theory, and then by trying to use his own simplistic case-
study to critique other more detailed case-studies, Lovering has managed to 
effectively ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’.  
While sympathetic to the general tenor of new regionalist thinking, this paper 
argues for a more synthetic approach to understandings of the significance of the 
region as an effective arena for positioning economic governance. It argues that 
current research in the new regionalism is becoming chaotic by bundling together too 
many diverse theories for it to be a coherent intellectual project. United by a common 
rejection of the unsatisfactory methodological and theoretical work of traditional 
regional analysis, this paper argues that the new regionalism currently finds itself lost 
within a web of uncoordinated and politicised ‘islands’ (Section 1, cf. Purcell, 2003).  
The remainder of the paper then expands upon these narrow and insular 
readings of particular aspects of the new regionalism by highlighting some of the 
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critical debates that remain either absent or poorly expressed. In Section 2, I argue 
that while the term ‘region’ has been an object of mystery, and that ‘regional change’ 
remains an elusive concept, a critical reappraisal of the nature of both regional spaces 
and regional change can be achieved through their study in relation to other scales of 
inquiry. Section 3 interrogates the unfolding role of the region and the regional scale 
in the ongoing reconstitution of the capitalist space economy, arguing that there are a 
set of macro-economic insights which highlight a greater force operating above and 
beyond the policy-oriented focus of the new regionalism. Whilst sceptical of imported 
policy solutions, Section 4 shows how policymakers find themselves paradoxically 
drawn (almost by definition) to favour policy ideals which are informed by the 
experiences of prosperous regions. Tackling the accusations that the new regionalism 
has been constructed upon inadequate foundations, I advance the case for adopting 
empirics-based, intensive single-region case-study research. Finally, in Section 5, the 
paper highlights how the theoretical and methodological foundations upon which the 
new regionalism is founded actively require a new self-reflective critical engagement. 
 
1. Unpacking the New Regionalism 
 As I have begun to detail above, the new regionalism has evolved into a rather 
‘chaotic concept’ (see Section 5). This section therefore seeks to unpack the new 
regionalism further by tracing its emergence through its dual origins in economic 
geography and political science. What follows constitutes only a synopsis of some of 
the key schools of thought that have coalesced under the banners of ‘economic’ and 
‘political’ new regionalism. 
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1.1 The ‘dominant’: economic new regionalism 
 The new regionalism has undoubtedly emerged with an overt economic focus, 
drawn out through its close links with institutional economics, economic sociology 
and evolutionary political economy (MacLeod, 2001b). In contrast to earlier 
geographical analyses which privileged inquiry of the national scale and the nation 
state (Peck and Tickell, 1992), these geographers sought to interrogate the 
mesogeographies of economic life, and the reflexive ‘frameworks’ in and through 
which economic development is being constituted and governed.  
Firstly, the influential work of Amin and Thrift on the ‘new institutionalism’ 
highlighted how the economic success of a region is not exclusively the domain of a 
narrow set of economic factors. Coining the phrase ‘institutional thickness’, they 
offered a rebuttal of cruder versions of the dominant discourse of globalisation 
contending that the local merely reacts to global economic realities. Drawing on a 
combination of institutional economics and economic sociology, the authors explicitly 
focus on the ability and capacity to territorially embed global processes in place. 
Building upon the study of ‘growth poles’, they articulated that although economic 
factors are important, social and cultural factors also “live at the heart of economic 
success” (Amin and Thrift, 1994: 14). Key to this ‘thickening’ process in regions is 
not the hard institutionalism through the presence of the institutions themselves, but 
the soft institutionalism (through the build-up of social capital) that underpins and 
stimulates a digressive entrepreneurship.  
Secondly, Cooke and Morgan’s (1993; 1994) work created the belief that 
interactive networking, and not just the state, facilitate economic growth. Their 
approach is particularly important because through the highlighting of different 
structures of governance occurring in the dynamic growth economies, policy 
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templates can be formulated to stimulate less-favoured regions (such as their focus on 
neo-Conservative Wales, cf. Cooke, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Morgan, 1997). 
Employing the ‘institutions of innovation’ metaphor, they explain how operations at 
the regional scale revolve centrally around a networked hub of both private and public 
sector institutions to produce ‘regional innovation networks’ that stimulate economic 
growth (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Following the work of the evolutionary economist 
Lundvall, at the heart of this canon of work is the belief that “knowledge is the most 
strategic resource and learning the most important process” (Lundvall, 1994). It is 
argued that through the creation of both hard institutional structures and the formation 
of soft institutional processes ‘intelligent regions’ emerge, which posses the capacity 
to develop regional prosperity. 
Thirdly, drawing inspiration from the wider Atlantic economic arena, 
Storper’s ‘regional world action framework’ argues that there is a new era of reflexive 
capitalism whereby the sharing and networking of information is replacing market-
based competition. Defining contemporary reflexive capitalism, Storper describes it 
as “a system that manufactures new kinds of risks…In the economic sphere, these 
risks are expressed through the redefinition of competition - what it takes to win and 
how it is possible to lose”. Furthering this, he further contends that “[W]inning has 
become a much more complex target, because the conditions…in order to win are 
manufactured and remanufactured more thoroughly and more rapidly than ever 
before, creating a moving target for success and a shifting minefield of risks and 
failures” (Storper, 1997: 30). 
Contrasting the approach adopted by many economic geographers in the 
privileging of the national scale, Storper (1997: 5) draws on the theory of conventions 
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to analyse the micro-geographies of social identities and the participative nature of the 
economic actors involved so that the role of the region is as: 
 
“[T]he locus of what economists are beginning to call ‘untraded 
interdependencies’, which take the forms of conventions, informal rules and 
habits that coordinate economic actors under conditions of uncertainty; these 
relations constitute region-specific assets in production. These assets are a 
central form of scarcity in contemporary capitalism, and hence a central form 
of geographical differentiation in what is done, how it is done, and in the 
resulting wealth levels and growth rates of regions.” 
 
Elements of Storper’s thinking here originate in the new economies of 
technological change of the 1980s, which argued that such knowledge or practices are 
not fully codifiable. Moreover, the particular firms that succeed in the acquisition of 
such knowledge are inherently tied into various forms of networks with other firms 
through a combination of formal and informal exchanges (‘untraded 
interdependencies’).  As we can see, regions were increasingly becoming defined as 
‘learning regions’ with their capacity to act as collectors, mediators and re-distributors 
of knowledge, ideas and innovation (Florida, 1995). For Storper, the regional scale is 
the “key, necessary element in the ‘supply architecture’ for learning and innovation” 
(Storper, 1997: 22). Furthermore, success in knowledge creation and innovative 
learning processes can lead to an economic territorialisation whereby an activity’s 
economic viability is rooted in practical and relational assets that cannot be easily 
replicated or imitated in other places and that are not available in many other places.  
In an argument that I pick up on later in this paper, it is interesting that in a 
recently co-authored paper, Storper does appear to offer a case for the building up of 
regional institutions (including ‘government agencies, civic associations, and private-
public partnerships’) as a window of locational opportunity which represents a 
“critical domain of beneficial policy intervention” (Scott and Storper, 2003: 587). 
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However, Scott and Storper (ibid., 588) seem quick to offer a qualifier to this, rightly 
stating that the “regional components of economic development policy under 
contemporary conditions pose a knife-edge dilemma” between on the one hand 
designed and coordinated policy to strengthen regional agglomeration economies, and 
on the other hand highlighting the dangers of such isolated policies for region-specific 
policy. 
 
1.2 The ‘other’: alternative new regionalism 
 The alternative to economic new regionalism provides a theoretical insight 
from the political-sciences which is concerned with the powerful challenges to the 
nation-state and the territorial structures of economic governance, arguing that a 
progressive new regionalism has been sweeping across Western Europe since the 
mid-1980s (Keating, 1998). Keating proposes that these challenges to the authority of 
the nation-state – as the prime regulator and controller of economic governance and 
the anchor of cultural identities – has seen the rise of the regional-state as a viable and 
forthright partner in the search for a successful compromise between state and market. 
Keating offers a similar perspective to Jessop’s hollowing-out of the state by 
promoting a territorial transformation of the state where its power is being eroded 
from above by internationalisation, from below by regional/local assertion, and finally 
by lateral advance of the market and civil society1
 Identified in MacLeod’s (2001b) paper, there are three independent political 
economic tensions that provide the framework for Keating’s progressive new 
regionalism: functional regionalisation, institutional regionalisation and political 
regionalism. Drawing together the three different strands of Keating’s progressive 
.  
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new regionalism, regions are viewed as the sites and arenas for generating post-
national identities and instilling social cohesion through the re-shaping of political 
space and encouraging new forms of socio-political mobilisation. While Keating’s 
depictions offer profitable conceptual ideas from ethno-nationalism to regional 
identity, the political reality of new regionalist inspired policies in countries like 
Britain has been their explicit nature as being driven (by the state) through top-down 
forms of economic regionalisation, with ideas of political regionalism their implicitly. 
 
1.3 Towards a critique 
The new regionalism provides a strong diversity of empirically supported 
research into the trial-and-error search for the best socio-spatial fix for advanced 
capitalism. However, homogeneity and orthodoxy in political and economic theory is 
never as close to the truth as many accounts in academia would make us believe, with 
the new regionalism being no exception. In the case of the new regionalism, its 
orthodoxy has been transformed in recent years towards a series of obligatory 
theoretical and methodological rear guards. This transformation in outlook and 
direction was inspired by Lovering’s (1999) Theory Led By Policy: The Inadequacies 
of the ‘New Regionalism’, which is universally seen as the theoretical and empirical 
springboard from which the new regionalism – and moreover, critical regional studies 
per se – began to reappraise its own internal rubric (see Section 5). Lovering critiqued 
the new regionalism as a shorthand explanation for highlighting the significance of 
the region as a prospective challenger to the nation-state as an effective arena for 
locating the institutions of post-Fordist political-economic governance (Boyer and 
Hollingsworth, 1997).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 For Keating the redefinition of the social and economic understanding of territory in Western Europe 
is being contextualised not only by the state but also by the changing international market and an 
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The new regionalism has emerged as a fashionable banner offering “both a 
convincing theoretical explanation” and for its followers “the best approach to policy 
formation” (Lovering, 1999: 380). Lovering has extreme difficulty in accepting why 
the new regionalism has been afforded such a lofty position within institutionalist 
political-economic geography. In its broadest terms, he views the new regionalism as 
a highly selective amalgam of ‘all things good’ in the regional economies of the world 
today. Arguing that the empirical case-studies of the regional growth economies of 
Western Europe and North America merely “tells an attractive and persuasive story”, 
Lovering posits from the viewpoint of Wales that the authors of the new regionalism 
are living out an academic fantasy (ibid., 380).   
Drawing on the critical stance adopted by MacLeod (2001b) this paper 
attempts to partially rescue the new regionalism from its own lines of weakness by 
picking up the theory through a sympathetic critique. In the next section, I begin to 
uncover some new and emerging themes by suggesting that the new regionalism has 
neglected the full and necessary engagement with relationships between the region 
and the state.  
 
2. Regions and Multifaceted Scalar Politics 
The chaotic nature of the new regionalism – generated by bundling too many 
diverse theories together – has led to inherent structural weaknesses that begin to 
appear in the earliest lines of inquiry. This section argues that the term ‘region’ is an 
object of mystery and that ‘regional change’ remains an elusive concept. My purpose 
here, however, is not to argue that the prerogative of new regionalists is to attempt 
naïve accounts of what regions are in the traditional sense (for that would be a major 
                                                                                                                                                                      
emerging continental regime. 
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step back). Instead, I want to move the argument forward towards a critical 
reappraisal of the nature of both regional spaces and regional change in relation to 
other scales of inquiry. 
 
2.1 The region: an object of mystery 
Whilst urban geographers have had a struggle to define the limits of the city 
and the locality geographers of the late-eighties struggled to define locality as more 
than simply place, regional geographers have struggled to define the boundaries of 
their key constituent term: notably, what is a region? The plurality of approaches and 
the diversity of theories that constitute an increasingly chaotic new regionalism have 
only served to exacerbate this weakness. Whereas economic new regionalists 
conceptualise regions as urban-metropolitan agglomerations invoked out of political-
economic interdependence and focusing on commonalities of production patterns, 
labour markets and market linkages (Scott, 1998), political new regionalists 
commonly represent regions as territorial and political subnational administrative 
units (Keating, 1998). Allen et al. (1998: 2) encapsulated these ambiguities and 
difficulties when they stated that: 
 
“[Regional] studies are always done for a purpose, with a specific aim in view. 
Whether theoretical, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a specific 
focus. One cannot study everything, and there are always multiple ways of 
seeing a place: there is no complete ‘portrait of a region’. Moreover, ‘regions’ 
only exist in relation to particular criteria. They are not ‘out there’ waiting to 
be discovered, they are our (and others’) constructions.” 
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The chaotic nature of the new regionalism has served to increasingly 
distanciate regional economic geographers2
 Firstly, there seems an inherent and immediate need within the new 
regionalism to reincorporate the work of the ‘new regional geography’ into our new 
regionalist theories. This author concurs with others in that the work of Anssi Paasi 
(1986; 1991) and his interpretative geohistorical approach could provide the entry 
point needed to re-inject the region into critical regional studies (MacLeod, 1998; 
2001a; 2001b; MacLeod and Jones, 2001). The work of Paasi and the new regional 
geographers provides a strong reminder that an overt focus on political-economic 
definitions of the region and the regional scale are truncating possible understandings 
of the events and processes occurring at the regional level. Secondly, the social 
constructivist work of Allen et al. (1998) on the shift away from ideas of fixity and 
stasis in the neo-liberal heartland of England’s South West region, offers significant 
 from explicit engagement with their 
‘supposedly foundational concept’ (Lovering, 1999). Scholars of the new regionalism 
have, I argue, sought implicit engagement with the region because it has served as the 
backdrop/tool for promoting their theoretical concepts of innovation, learning, and 
knowledge-based economic frameworks. It is worth emphasising that many of these 
scholars are not regional geographers per se, but economic geographers (Scott, 
Storper), economists (Krugman), and business gurus (Porter, Ohmae), whose work 
has seen them both incorporated into, and become creators, of the new regionalism. 
However, the question remains: where does the future of the region lie within the new 
regionalism? Again, I do not seek to provide a definitive answer to this question, but 
merely offer a sympathetic appraisal of two potentially untapped avenues of 
theoretical engagement. 
                                                          
2 I say regional economic geographers here deliberately because I would give partial exemption to these 
accusations because Michael Keating and his colleagues in the political-science strand of the new 
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scope for new regionalists to consolidate their current work through working in closer 
conjunction with the re-emergent scalar debates (see Marston, 2000; Brenner, 2001).  
 Moreover, while a range of often multi-disciplinary approaches have informed 
how, in a climate of economic regionalisation, political-administrative regions are 
strategic territories in a complex multiscalar political fix, these are being challenged 
by relational approaches “where emerging spatial configurations are not necessarily or 
purposively territorial or scalar but are constituted through the spatiality of flow, 
porosity, and connectivity” (Jones et al., 2006). While assessing the respective merits 
of alternative conceptualisations of regions (territorial and topological) is fundamental 
in enhancing new regionalist research, we must not stop there, because taken together 
these avenues point towards and identify the next structural weakness that requires 
critical reappraisal. 
 For a canon of work struggling to explicitly incorporate its foundational 
concept into its theories, the new regionalism has an even greater challenge to 
surmount. As Purcell (2003: 318) clearly iterates: “[O]ne cannot understand a 
particular scale without analysing its relationship to other scales, since the meaning 
and importance of each scale is unavoidably embedded in its interscalar 
relationships”. Critically, if we are seeking to comprehend the nature and fabric of 
what a region is, then we must move beyond the singular studies that have treat the[ir] 
region in relative isolation.  
 
2.2 The Absent State 
While diversity and debate within critical regional geography is essential, 
persistent division and lack of collaborative working with scholars investigating 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regionalism have been more explicit in their attempts to do this. 
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processes and relations operating at alternative scales is detrimental to its 
understanding. What is required are a series of explicit steps taken by new regionalists 
in order to create distance from singular readings of the[ir] regional scale3
Following this development of the ‘hollowing-out’ metaphor in the analysis of 
economic and political restructuring of the state, authors such as Goodwin et al. 
(2005) have sought analytically to consider and extend Jessop’s strategic-relational 
approach by arguing that it is no longer sufficient simply to refer to a multivariate 
‘hollowing-out’ of the nation state. Empirically supported by the recent wave of 
. Regional 
analyses therefore need to focus more clearly on the changing relationships among 
different scales. Within new regionalist analyses I see the particular need to explore 
through more rigorous approaches the relationship between the region and the nation-
state. In view of this context, I concur with Markusen’s (1999: 871) claim that “[I]f 
state activity, based on complex politics and inter-bureau competition, is central to the 
evolution of regions, it must be built into our theories”.  
Recent research has already done much to recognise the urgent need to 
consider the shifting nature and scalar configurations of the state but expansion on 
these ideas remains necessary (Jones, 2001; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a; 1999b). 
There is still the need to move beyond the accusation that the new regionalism is “a 
poor framework through which to grasp the real connections between the 
regionalisation of business and governance and the changing role of the state” 
(Lovering, 1999: 391). State theorists have been arguing through the ‘hollowing-out’ 
thesis that what we are witnessing is a shift away from the one-nation state 
interventionism of Fordist-welfarism towards a newly emergent regulatory mode 
(Jessop, 2002).  
                                                          
3 The idea of a singular reading of the regional scale is taken from the work of Neil Brenner (2001) 
who used the same concept to critique an earlier paper by Sallie Marston (2000) which he argued treat 
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constitutional change in Britain, and the authors’ desires to explain and understand the 
new institutional geographies of the British State, Goodwin et al. rightly argue that: 
 
“‘Hollowing out’ refers to the delegation of powers away from the national 
level, and makes no explicit claims about the organisational or institutional 
forms that may result from this. In other words, it refers to the beginnings of a 
process in motion, and one needs other conceptual devices to help in the 
understanding about how and why that process subsequently unfolds…This 
focus means that ‘hollowing out’ is unable to give one much purchase on the 
processes of state restructuring that takes place at different territorial scales.” 
Goodwin et al. (2005: 424 emphasis added) 
  
 In furthering their critique, the authors forward the argument that processes of 
devolution and decentralisation represent a geographically uneven ‘filling-in’ of the 
state’s institutional and scalar matrix, which leads to an increasingly complex spatial 
division of the state. Where Jessop’s strategic-relational approach only offered a lens 
on the shifting powers away from the nation state at the beginning of the process of 
restructuring, Goodwin et al. offer a new conceptual tool which enables researchers to 
investigate both the scalar recipients of these powers (i.e. the view of the state and the 
region), and to critically speculate on the processes which facilitate these transfers: 
 
“The use of the concept of ‘filling in’, then, focuses on the manner in which 
power is being transferred, and on the scales it is being transferred to. In other 
words, the very process of ‘filling in’ is geographically constituted and 
spatially constructed – in contrast to ‘hollowing out’, which can imply an 
abstract sense of restructuring away from one level only (the national). Above 
all, ‘filling in’ is illustrative of a state that is a political process in motion.” 
Goodwin et al. (2005: 424 emphasis added) 
 
For new regionalists, however, it is imperative to recognise that this should not 
be seen as a privileging of their scale of inquiry though, but acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the household in isolation from other scales. 
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arguments purveyed through the relativisation of scale (Collinge, 1999; Brenner et al., 
2003).  
In recent times, a third wave of conceptualising the state role in post-war 
capitalism has tentatively begun to emerge whereby for the state to be an effective 
animateur it must be reconstructed rather than dismantled as was the case in second-
wave neo-liberal ideology (Morgan, 1997; Scott, 1998). Adopting the language of 
Cooke and Morgan (1998), this third wave concentrates on enhancing a state’s 
capacity rather than its size, and has been termed the ‘associational repertoire’. 
Although some variants of associational theory would have state almost wither away 
(Hurst, 1994; Ohmae, 1995), a state that withdrew from ‘direct intervention to indirect 
animation’ need not be a weak or ineffective state (ibid.: 23). Moreover, if regulated 
delegation of state competencies – through the devolution of power and the delegation 
of certain tasks – to local/regional actors results in policy goals being met more 
effectively, then the state can actually become stronger by doing less and enabling 
more. Contemporary state restructuring should, therefore, be seen as the most recent 
political-economic strategy attempting to rescale state intervention. Adopting an 
intermediary position juxtaposed between the classical state-centred and neo-liberal 
repertoires privileging of the state and the market respectively, the key issue for 
associational theory is not the scale of intervention per se but the mode of 
intervention. 
In this regard, the state does not lose its unique status as the institution with 
overall responsibility for the national innovation systems and social cohesion. In this 
regard, one effect of after-Keynesian welfarist experiments has been the exposure of 
regions, through the erosion of national fiscal support, to an intensification of inter-
spatial competition. Compelled to experiment with Schumpeterian supply-side 
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policies, regions have emerged as a territorial expression of the wider programmes of 
state restructuring (Martin and Sunley, 1997; Lipietz, 2003). The net outcome of state 
restructuring is that: 
 
“Particular forms of economic and political system privilege some strategies 
over others, access by some forces over others, some interests over others, 
some spatial scales of action over others, some time horizons over others, 
some coalition possibilities over others” (Jessop, 1997: 63). 
 
 My immediate concern here is with the positionality of the new regionalism 
within this broader context of political-economic geography. Touched upon 
previously, new regionalists have become largely confined to a particular ‘island of 
practice’ (Purcell, 2003) whereby their analysis has become entrenched in treating the 
region in relative (singular) isolation from other scales of inquiry. This being true, 
new regionalists are not studying a scale per se, but some other sociospatial entity 
(e.g. a site, an arena). This is both deeply problematic and quite inadequate if we are 
to fully explore the events and processes occurring in the regional world. However, it 
would be an unfair to label the new regionalism as wholly unprogressive in this field 
since it has ventured towards asserting the region as embedded in other scales. My 
argument here would be that this should not suffice if we are to engage in truly critical 
regional studies. It is here that I want to turn briefly to the recent scalar debates, 
especially the work of Brenner (2001) and Purcell (2003), to introduce some explicit 
steps towards creating a new regional framework for analysis. 
 Whilst Brenner (2001) made implicit his defining limits to scale, Purcell 
(2003) clarified these through a series of more explicit statements: (i) asserting that a 
particular scale is embedded in other scales is very different from developing a full 
analysis of how scalar inter-relationships were produced and reproduced through 
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political struggle; and, (ii) scholars are quick to acknowledge the importance of other 
topics beyond their particular focus, but therefrom fail to take the explicit steps 
required to push their analysis beyond the limits of their particular ‘island’ (Purcell, 
2003: 327-328). In my view, both these statements hold deep resonance in their 
support for the earlier argument that a lack of engagement with the state (and more 
often than not, the local state also) is a major structural weakness at the heart of new 
regionalist analyses. By way of example, incorporation of these arguments/claims 
could only serve to advance new regionalists knowledge surrounding the key 
argument regarding the operations of multi-tiered structures of governance: are the 
events and processes at the regional level actually resolving the problem, or, are they 
simply rescaling them? These debates could not only profit from engagement in full 
analyses of how scalar inter-relationships are produced and reproduced through 
political struggle, but they are a necessity for a critical regional studies. 
 Furthermore, in this evolving framework the policy lineage is inescapable in 
the new regionalism with the theoretical ideas generated intimately dovetailing at the 
regional level. Unwittingly the new regionalism is firmly rooted in a dangerous 
paradox: the state remains the primary channel through which regional policy is co-
ordinated and mediated, yet we are accused of failing to incorporate the state into our 
theories. This association with the state and its policy lineage is undoubtedly at the 
kernel of the problem facing the new regionalism. 
 
3. Geographies of State Intervention and Tangled Policy Hierarchies 
The historiography of regional policy shows a number of important trends that 
are too often overlooked by its academic and political proponents. It is worth 
mentioning at the outset that the significance of regional level co-ordination has 
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shown itself most clearly at times of national crisis, in attempts to consolidate the 
national state power at the centre (Paddison, 1983). Furthermore, the emergence of 
the so-called ‘motor-regions’, which have dominated empirical accounts within the 
new regionalism, are now in a period of relative decline compared with their much 
vaunted exploitation of the post-Fordist regime of flexible specialisation (see 
MacLeod, 2001b: 808). Finally, these prosperous growth regions are all located 
within the stronger national economies, which makes the link between state and 
region all the more important.  
In this section, the article turns towards answering a further problematic within 
the new regionalism regarding the unfolding role of the region and the regional scale 
in the ongoing reconstitution of the capitalist space economy and its related public 
policy dynamics. Drawing extensively on the writings of David Harvey in The Limits 
to Capital, this section on multifaceted scalar politics is split twofold: the first part 
examines the role of regions within crisis theory, while the second part looks at the 
interesting ideas surrounding interregional competition and its policy implications. 
 
3.1 Regions and the State 
Providing a Marxist-oriented polemic on capitalism and its associated socio-
cultural system, Harvey’s (1982) The Limits to Capital still sheds important light on 
(regional) political-economic geography. Harvey’s usage of the region is as an 
economic container that harbours an important role in the dawning crisis of the 
capitalist production system and mode of regulation. ‘First-cut’ crisis theory relates to 
the inherent instability of the capitalist mode of production and the tendency of profit-
levels to rise and fall predominantly through labour exploitation. ‘Second-cut’ crisis 
theory introduces temporal elements, where the displacements of internal crises of a 
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stalling capitalist system are reconfigured through financial arrangements and the 
creation of credit systems. ‘Third-cut’ crisis theory is the attempt to juxtapose both the 
temporal and spatial displacement of crisis, forcing society to seek relief though a 
form of ‘spatial fix’ (ibid., 427).  
Critical to the new regionalist project is the implicit link between Harvey’s 
theoretical speculation contained within his ‘third-cut’ theory of crisis and the recent 
acknowledgement that through the erosion of national fiscal support, regions and 
localities have been opened up to intensified inter-spatial competition; and, therefore, 
forced to experiment with Schumpeterian supply-side policies designed to exploit the 
after-Fordist knowledge-based economy. If we are in agreement with this, the 
exposure of regions to external possibilities will become more than a little confused 
with ‘inner’ and ‘outer transformations’ becoming blurred as regional boundaries 
become increasingly porous to both capital and labour (Harvey, 1982). 
 
“The region, far from resolving its problems of overaccumulation through the 
creation of external relations, may be forced into even more savage 
devaluation through outside pressure. Interregional competition becomes the 
order of the day. And the relative strengths of different territorially based 
alliances become an important factor.” (Harvey, 1982: 427). 
 
As Harvey warns, the “geography of uneven development helps convert the 
crisis tendencies of capitalism into compensating regional configurations of rapid 
accumulation and devaluation” with the possibility existing that “the global pace of 
accumulation can be sustained through compensating oscillations within the 
[regional] parts” (ibid., 428).  
MacLeod’s (2001a; 2001b) analysis of ‘thin political economy’ in the new 
regionalism builds on this concern by stressing the need to focus more closely on the 
role played by the state in the remaking of both regional economies and their 
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structures of governance. The heavy emphasis on Schumpeterian supply-side 
innovation and the creation of increasingly flexible and less formal networks of 
economic governance have largely been responsible for new regionalists implicit, if at 
times absent, theorisations of the capitalist state.  
To extend this further, I see future research in the new regionalism having a 
necessary obligation to (re)incorporate these themes into their work in order to 
examine the increasing complexity involved in the way that the state produces, 
reproduces, and articulates the scalar and spatial sites of economic governance 
(Brenner, 2004). Utilising Harvey’s macro-theoretical insights into the operative 
nature of capitalism will continue to be important for the new regionalism whilst the 
region is seen as the temporary socio-spatial fix for contemporary crises in the 
capitalist system. 
 
3.2 Interregional competition 
For some there is a capitalist logic behind interspatial and therefore 
interregional competition, due to inherently induced spatio-temporal crises in the 
mode of production (Harvey, 2000; cf. Massey, 1979). MacLeod (2001b: 819) has 
rightly pointed out that new regionalists have occasionally become obsessive in their 
quest to characterise the individual processes and form of ‘popular’ regions, resulting 
in the diversion of attention away from the “complex multi-scalar re-territorialisation 
of institutional capacity”. This is particularly apparent across the political spectrum 
where a false consensus has emerged that national and regional competition is the 
only pathway to prosperity. Superficially convinced by discourses of intelligence, 
innovation and knowledge-based economies, there is a dangerous obsession 
circulating that all regions can be winners. To take just one example, a leading edge 
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policy development occurring within England through the creation of Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) illustrates this fallacy: 
 
“Past policies have failed to resolve the underlying weakness of the least 
successful regions and have failed to capitalise on their strengths. It is time to 
reverse what has in some cases been decades of under performance and 
decline and to put in place policies that will widen the winners circle.” 
(Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 2000) 
 
“[T]he role of central Government must be to ensure that all regions and 
communities have the resources and capability to be winners.” (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2001: Para 3.3) 
 
 Regional competitiveness also has the practical implication that it can create 
inherently poor public policy if it fosters a wasteful zero-sum game. More worryingly, 
cost-based competition remains absent from our theories with new regionalists 
viewing it as incompatible with conceptualisations of flexibly specialised 
agglomerations (Christopherson, 2003).  
Even more ambitious reading of the new regionalism’s portrayal of learning, 
innovation, and knowledge, argues that beneath this veneer of uniformed success is a 
deeply unsafe political-economic base that is premised upon uneven development, 
‘savage’ interregional competition, rapid accumulation (resulting in overaccumulation 
and devaluation), and finally geographical inertia (Harvey, 1982: 426-428). If these 
warnings are to be taken serious and “the upshot is that some regions boom while 
others decline” (ibid., 427), then new regionalists must build both sides of the 
argument it into their theory. 
 
4. Policy Ingredients: A Recipe for Disaster? 
Presently, the new regionalism finds itself deeply rooted in a vicious circle of 
conflicting interests. Sceptical of imported policy solutions, new regionalists find 
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themselves paradoxically drawn (almost by definition) to favour those policy 
measures which are informed by the experiences of prosperous regions, characterised 
by their embedded local interdependencies. While some regulatory institutions may in 
a structural sense be duplicated, their operation and effects most certainly cannot be 
repeated. This paradox currently endangers the quality of new regionalist inquiry 
because: (i) institutions do have effects, but they can’t be guaranteed; (ii) policy 
imitations of successful regions do not account for the effects of state regulation; (iii) 
the effects of institutions is dependent upon contingent local conditions; and (iv) the 
time lag between the creation of institutions between successful and less favoured 
regions cannot be accounted for. Thus, a perception of enjoying the profits of local 
economic development through the cloning of an amalgam of institutional 
arrangements coveted from successful regional economies is simply a misnomer, and 
has led Lovering (1999: 390) to coin the catchy but powerful metaphor that the 
‘policy-tail is wagging the analytical dog’. In this regard, I acknowledge that while 
my argument here is for regional analyses that bring geography back in, the reality is 
that policy emulation has become part of the orthodoxy of practice. 
For its proponents, these serious accusations strike at the very heart of how we 
presently go about doing our research. Both sympathetically and critically, the 
remainder of this section debates some of the so-called ‘ingredients’ that make up the 
policy frameworks inherently associated with new regionalist ideology. Finally, I 
attempt to advance the case for adopting empirics-based intensive single-region case-
study research in order to move beyond some of the current policy trajectories.  
 
4.1 Path dependency: an historical weakness 
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The rise of institutional and evolutionary economics and economic sociology 
have jointly stressed that economic life is both an instituted process, a socially 
embedded activity, and therefore context-specific and path dependent in its evolution.  
In contrast to previous orthodoxy with economies believed to have the capacity to 
return to equilibrium through the actions of rational actors, processes of 
institutionalisation now take on the mantra of stabilising an inherently unstable and 
irrational economy (Amin, 1999). Historically, political-economic commentators have 
taken institutions for granted and naturalised their existence and role.  
 
“Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s 
choices (and define them in the modelling of economic performance) without 
tracing the incremental evolution of institutions. But we are just beginning the 
serious task of exploring the implications of path dependence” (North, 1990: 
100). 
 
 
Furthermore, as Storper laments: 
 
“[W]hat we do is path-dependent, that is, truly historical; it is not the result of 
a series of action on spot markets, where the long term can be reduced to a 
series of disconnected instants.” (Storper, 1997: 18). 
 
 Michael Porter’s cluster programme is the most prominent example that has in 
policy circles contradicted the institutionalist stress on context specificity and path 
dependency. Irrespective of regional histories and economic characters, cluster 
programmes have become a standardised practice that have taken away from regions 
the potential capacity for development through deeper assessments of their 
institutional and socio-cultural specificities. Interestingly, Porter’s most recent 
contribution argues this: “regions should focus on upgrading the productivity of 
clusters in which they have a meaningful position, rather than attempting to migrate 
more ‘desirable’ clusters” (2003: 571). However, Martin and Sunley (2003: 24) are 
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quite right to point out that the widespread applicability of a concept as elastic as the 
cluster results in its analytical explanations of causality and determination in relation 
to regional and local economic growth becoming increasingly blunted and stretched 
towards breaking-point.  
 
“There is a fundamental tension between the public policy desire to include as 
many firms as possible and the notion that policy interventions can be more 
cost effective if they are targeted in some way. But if the policy is too 
targeted, then it starts to look like old style industrial policy and too close to 
the discredited notion of ‘picking winners’.” 
 
 My argument here is not with the concept of clusters or cluster policy per se 4
If contemporary analysis is to go further, we need to move beyond the 
assumption that because there appears to be a link between some high-growth 
economies and spatial agglomeration that this is the only (or main) explanation. 
Similarly, we need to build upon recent thinking that highlights how the missing link 
, 
but with the relationship that exists between them and their institutionalisation. As 
such, the policy community faces a problematic conundrum which to date it has 
preferred to defer judgement on. It is increasingly important from both an analytical 
and public policy perspective to be able to “distinguish between the conditions under 
which industrial spatial concentration will take place and the conditions under which 
it will not” (McCann and Sheppard, 2003: 650). Unfortunately for the new 
regionalism, the trend that currently holds sway with the policy community is this 
failure to see beyond the “rewarding lifestyle experiences…based on an image of a 
high-productivity, knowledge-rich, decentralised, entrepreneurial and socially 
progressive economy within the reach of local policy-makers” (Martin and Sunley, 
2003: 29).  
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in the clustering debate is actually their institutionalisation i.e. their inability to travel 
(Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). While clustering and spatial agglomerations have 
been one of the prime focuses of the policy community recently, a second strand of 
the new regionalists' work has also transgressed this boundary. 
 
4.2 Social capital 
Contemporary theorists have argued that there is an economic and democratic 
dividend that can be achieved through the occupation of institutional voids by weaker 
economic groupings and civic based third-sector organisations. The leading proponent 
of these ideas is Robert Putnam whose phrase ‘social capital’ has caught the 
imagination of academics and policymakers alike. For Putnam (1993: 179), social 
capital is defined as: 
 
“[F]eatures of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trusts, that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital 
enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital and is 
coming to be seen as a vital ingredient in economic development around the 
world” 
 
Indicative of this theoretical standpoint is the belief that social trust, norms of 
reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation are mutually 
reinforcing and cumulative. Organised collaboration can therefore enable the norms 
and networks of civic engagement to contribute to economic prosperity, which can in 
turn be reinforced by that prosperity. In concluding his original conceptualisations, 
Putnam (ibid., 185) illustrates that although this won’t be an easy task, there are also 
democratic benefits for state accountability: “building social capital will not be easy, 
but it is the key to making democracy work”. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 For a detailed account of clusters and cluster policy see, Journal of Economic Geography (2003) and 
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For the new regionalism, the operation of institutional routines and their 
associated societal conventions “are best developed at the regional level because this 
is the level at which regular trust-building, can be sustained over time” (Morgan, 
1997: 501). Cooke (1998: 15) shares this opinion whereby regions can foster “closer 
interfirm collaboration and, crucially, the soft infrastructure of enterprise support 
provided by innovative substate governance institutions”. Unfortunately, what is often 
omitted from contemporary thinking is a critical understanding of the 
institutionalisation or constitutionalisation of social processes in the building of 
regions into the social consciousness (cf. Paasi, 1986).  
 In the associational economy, interactive government requires recognising the 
entitlement and the successful integration of the whole spectrum of political, 
economic, and civil interests so that the mode of social regulation becomes habitual. 
Elements of this thinking are pivotal to influential policymakers because while it is 
almost impossible to calculate the contribution of regional innovation networks and 
the production of social capital, in policy terms the fact that they are relatively 
inexpensive does count in their favour (Adams et al., 2003). However, there are a 
number of dangers surrounding an over-emphasis on concepts such as social capital 
that require greater understanding. Firstly, often implicitly overlooked by the new 
regionalism is that these advocated relationships based upon degrees of trust rather 
than on administrative fiat take time to be cemented.  
Secondly, there is an immediate danger that terms like social capital become 
deployed incorrectly in order to explain all things that remain unseen from analysts 
and policymakers. As Fine (2001) elicits, social capital is viewed as the “‘missing 
link’ that can explain any aspect of social, cultural or economic (under)performance, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Urban Studies (2004) 
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across time and place”. As I will argue in the next section, this misuse of terminology 
is deeply damaging for the new regionalism. Finally, there is a disconcerting risk that 
the institutionalist turn in regional geography and regional policy formation may by 
overly promoting the privileging of regional capacity building through the 
mobilisation of local capabilities. 
 
4.3 Soft institutionalism and the games of risk 
Institutionalist insistence on integrating the ‘softer’ aspects of political-
economic restructuring into its theories has undoubtedly increased the richness of 
regional analysis over the past decade, but it has also led to the inherent dangers of 
soft institutionalism (MacLeod, 2001a). Soft institutionalism is associated with the 
new regionalism due to its tendency to read-off institutional developments from 
successful regional economies that suit their needs and offer profit to their theoretical 
speculation. It is in considering this misguidance that Lovering (1999) offers a 
distinction between a ‘sophisticated’ and a ‘vulgar’ new regionalism; the latter 
fudging the question of abstraction in favour of a rush to make interpretative policy-
recommendations from illegitimate and inadequate foundations5. Typically, new 
regionalists through policy-transfer present a universally ‘functionalist’ argument 
about how institutions (whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’) make capitalist economies work. 
Missing here are the causal effects of the processes that are making and remaking the 
economic and institutional ensemble present in particular geographical locations; the 
new regionalism quite simply is missing its geography. This being the case, the new 
regionalism seems to occupy an uneasy relationship with the policy community 
resulting from the unwelcome political mantra that it offers quick-fix policy solutions. 
                                                          
5 MacLeod (2001b: 810) argues at this point that Lovering’s argument loses some of its appeal because 
nowhere in his article does he identify which new regionalist writers belong to which respective camp. 
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 At no juncture does the new regionalism explicitly state that the creation of 
networks of untraded interdependencies, or the production of institutional thickness 
will in isolation create successful economies. In fact, a ‘deeper’ reading of the new 
regionalism actually serves to alert the reader that there are very real dangers of 
adopting many of the strategies that they are reporting as operating in the successful 
regional growth economies of the world. Firstly, the much vaunted ‘social capital’ 
that is inescapable from new regionalist writings over the past ten years actually falls 
foul of Lovering’s vulgar conceptualising. Having transgressed into the world of the 
policymaker, the term social capital falls into the path dependency trap by arbitrarily 
focusing on one element in a long historical experience to explain present-day 
patterns. Simply put, Putnam’s social capital is the result of trying to construct a 
whole theory of social action from a very limited case study and needs to be 
understood as such. 
 Storper’s ‘regional world’ framework and his important contribution of 
untraded interdependencies to the theoretical understanding of soft institutional 
infrastructures exemplify this particular story. Mentioned earlier, these conventions, 
informal rules and habits that aid the coordination of economic actors under 
conditions of uncertainty constitute region-specific assets in production (Storper, 
1997). In the form of untraded interdependencies and conventions, Storper’s warning 
is that soft infrastructures are commonly locally-specific regional assets that are in 
effect non-codifiable. Politically, in contrast to traditional infrastructures such as 
transport networks and public organisations, the non-codifiable soft infrastructures 
that are associated with the intelligent learning regions are extremely difficult to 
transfer spatially from a successful region to other less favoured ones. 
Noncodifiability makes institutions ‘bad travellers’ (MacLeod, 2001a), especially 
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with institutions becoming “interdependent with other institutions, making it very 
difficult for a society to mimic the institutional arrangements of another country” 
(Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997: 455).  
All of this prompted Storper to speculate about the possibility that despite its 
unorthodox nature, social conventions based on interactive communication and the 
build-up of trust and loyalty are increasingly found at the core of reflexive 
capitalism’s new heterodox policy framework (Storper, 1997). At the heart of this 
framework is a series of key dilemmas that face the regionally based policymaker. 
Adopting a political strategy that seeks to create a specialist learning region with the 
end-goal of creating an economy that is fully territorialised runs the associated risk of 
future path-dependence and institutional ‘lock-in’ (Grabher, 1993).  
 Many new regionalist accounts have targeted ‘soft’ concepts such as trust and 
loyalty as exhibiting potential benefits as relational assets in building up the social 
capital and institutional thickness within knowledge-based regional economies. For 
policy advisors, unlike most other economic assets, trust is a commodity that cannot 
be bought, but its importance lies in the belief that it has a high value (Fox, 1974). 
The apparent simplicity of this argument is once again dangerously misleading in the 
way that it is presented. High-trust relationships amongst regional actors do not 
automatically confer the economic and democratic gains that many policymakers 
would believe. Notably, Marx’s insights into the nature of capitalist exploitation 
simply had no place for concepts of trust and loyalty. 
 Although agreeing with the notion that this is both a theoretically and 
empirically untenable position (cf. Cooke and Morgan, 1998), the belief that trust-
based relations within capitalist society run out in the face of economic uncertainty is 
an overplayed and misleading concept. Coalitions formed in time of crisis aren’t built 
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upon a form of trust per se but through an immediate pressure to form larger alliances 
in order to avoid submission and collapse. A closer look at the regional trust-based 
relationships in a country such as Britain shows how the important relationships 
between the state and foreign investors highlights how the so-called trust exhibited is 
purely a one-way process. The state has shown historically its ‘blind-faith’ in the 
loyalty and trust afforded to the foreign investors arriving at its shores (manifested 
through large locational subsidies and grants) which has had little reciprocity. In a 
very informative paper on the early observations surrounding the Korean 
conglomerate LG Electronics in South Wales, Phelps et al. (1998) posit the question: 
are we ‘tying the firm to the region or tying the region to the firm’? This is just one 
example in many that is illustrative not of trust and loyalty, but of economic 
dependency within new forms of capitalism. 
Constructed from this standpoint, Amin (1999) argues that the consequence of 
this centrality placed upon local capacity and civic interaction is the often-underrated 
importance that needs to be placed upon the ability of regions to anticipate and 
respond to the changing external circumstances. This provides a return to the critical 
argument for new regionalists towards an advocacy of the greater engagement with 
the processes of scalar and state restructuring. New regionalists must explore the 
‘management of the region’s wider connectivity’ because this is the primer for the 
internal supply-side qualities that researchers have been preoccupied with in the early 
years of empirical research and theory building (ibid.). 
 In a return to the issues of institutional thickness, civic interaction and soft 
institutionalism, it is necessary always to attend to the bigger picture surrounding 
what a number of institutionalist approaches have been arguing, surrounding how the 
embedded local milieu might ultimately have dangerous consequences for the 
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regional growth economies. Tying together a number of the strands mentioned earlier 
in this section, the building of institutional thickness might ultimately lead to an 
institutional ‘lock-in’ of routines and conventions that become dysfunctional in 
emerging economic conditions (Grabher, 1993). An important consequence of 
institutional thickness that has been raised by Hudson (1994: 211) whilst referring to 
once-prosperous regions (which at their height were also learning regions) is that if 
such internal connectivity is left unattended it can actually reinforce path-
dependencies which become increasingly inappropriate and outdated for the new 
economic circumstances.  
 
“[I]t is important to remember that the localised thick institutional structures 
that evolved in the past have often become a mechanism to stifle dissent or 
hinder opposition to what was regarded as the conventional wisdom of 
orthodox solutions.” 
 
 If we take this historical tale seriously, as we surely must, we have to ask 
ourselves how it can inform the new regionalist studies of contemporary regional 
growth economies? Prior to the notion of the new regionalism, Granovetter (1985) 
had already suggested that a network of weak ties could theoretically be more 
dynamic than those dominated by strong ties of enforced loyalty and contract-based 
relations. Granovetter utilises the interesting and pervasive example of crime 
networks to highlight how the strong ties that characterise such organisations lead to 
sporadic and catastrophical ruptures of the system due to increased pressure and 
‘lock-in’. Returning to an argument already made elsewhere within this paper, what 
we keep returning to is this need for a critical understanding of the processes of 
institutionalisation. 
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In view of all this focus and debate within the new regionalism regarding its 
relationship with policy, it increasingly seems that Lovering’s (1999: 390) claim that 
the “policy tail is wagging the analytical dog” and “wagging it so hard that indeed 
much of the theory is shaken out” is doing some disservice. It would be naïve to say 
that the new regionalism does not have an obligation to address the concern regarding 
the relationship between its theoretical abstraction and its playing up to the 
policymaking community, but through the examples highlighted in the second half of 
this paper it would also be difficult to argue that the new regionalism hasn’t attempted 
(at least partially successfully) to address this issue. 
 
4.4 ‘Doing’ Regional Regulation 
In both theoretical and political domains, it is something of a truism to declare 
that regions are on the agenda like never before. Until recently, however, 
methodological debate has been hiding in the backwaters of debates surrounding the 
resurgence of the region; specifically, the question of how do we approach such 
research. In fact I would argue that many of the weaknesses identified within the ‘new 
regionalism’ and approaches to ‘regional political economy’ have been reinforced by 
the methods deployed, and the subsequent lack of rigour in these approaches.  
Although Lovering (1999) and MacLeod (2001b) have provided the 
theoretical impetus for pursuing new avenues of research through their critiques of the 
new regionalism, I believe that their papers are insufficiently sensitive to the 
practicalities of actually doing regional regulation. In the case of Lovering (1999), his 
paper is an evocative commentary which explicitly deconstructs the new regionalism, 
but one which offers little in the way of a framework for rebuilding the component 
parts of this body of work so as to proffer a way forward. While sympathetic to the 
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general tenor of Lovering’s critique, in MacLeod’s own words he seeks to offer some 
‘sobering reflections on what might be recovered’ in an attempt to rescue the new 
regionalism (MacLeod, 2001b: 805). For MacLeod, this reconstruction of the new 
regionalism is to be achieved through the development of theoretical work within the 
regulation approach. In extending MacLeod’s reconstruction of the new regionalism 
beyond his narrow theoretical approach, it is in this spirit that I will sketch a new 
methodological framework for doing regional regulation.  
In the midst of a plethora of researchers undertaking many varied conceptual 
approaches to the study of why some regions work and others don’t in the new 
economic order, Ann Markusen (1999) spoke up against the prevailing research 
practices being adopted within the domain of regional studies. Markusen argues that 
while a great deal of new thought has emerged in regional studies over the last thirty-
years, with the cross-fertilisation of ideas from geographers, economists, political 
scientists and so on, enriching the development of research outputs, over the past 
fifteen years or so there has been a steady slippage in both the rigours of evidence and 
thus the quality of conceptualisation. In her pertinent methodological critique, 
Markusen laments three undesirable developments that have/are undermining the 
scientific integrity and societal relevance of regional studies. In the first instance, 
Markusen coins the catchy metaphor of ‘fuzzy concept’; one that posits an entity, 
phenomenon or process, which possesses two or more alternative meanings. Second, 
the standards of empirical evidence are slipping. Third, the fuzzy concepts and the 
falling standards of evidence increasingly weaken the policy relevance of regional 
studies. 
Picking up on the theme of ‘fuzzy concepts’, in contributing to a growing 
body of literature surrounding the engagement of geographers in public policy 
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research6, Ron Martin has been mutually critical of the language deployed within 
political-economic geography, arguing that they are lost in a ‘thicket of linguistic 
cleverness’. Moreover, he argues that this is fuelled by the distinct lack of rigour in 
their approaches, relying as they do too heavily on cherry-picked quotations/concepts 
from a few favourable geographical locations. It takes little interrogation to identify 
the body of work (the new regionalism) and the concepts (institutional milieu, 
regional innovation networks, associational regions, intelligent regions, institutional 
thickness, social capital, untraded interdependencies, and so on) which are being 
openly criticised here. For both Markusen (1999) and Martin (2001) these ‘fuzzy 
concepts’ simply collapse under any serious form of scrutiny or interrogation.  
New regionalist commentators have historically deployed conceptual 
terminology in a more or less interchangeable fashion, understanding little of their 
genesis, history, differences, or actual fundamental meaning (McCann and Sheppard). 
Responding to Markusen’s original provocations, Lagendijk (2003) justifiably argues 
that when academic scholars invoke new concepts, they usually reflect a specific 
contribution that marks their approach as different from previously conventional 
thinking. In practice, can we actually say that we know a cluster from a spatial 
agglomeration, an intelligent region from an innovative region, a regional innovation 
network from an institutional milieu, or for that matter, a network of untraded 
interdependencies from an associational economy?  
For new regionalist scholars, these accusations strike at the very foundations 
of our work by questioning the very essence of what we do. As I highlighted earlier, 
the chaotic nature of the new regionalism has served to increasingly distanciate 
regional economic geographers from explicit engagement with their ‘supposedly 
                                                          
6 See Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers, 1999-2000 
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foundational concept’ (Lovering, 1999); or should we now argue with their 
‘supposedly foundational fuzzy concept’. Ironically, when you cut your way through 
the thicket of spurious claims made by Markusen about undertaking research in 
critical regional studies (see below) she is indeed correct when obliging regional 
geographers to answer the question: so ‘how do I know when I see it?’ (Markusen, 
1999: 871). However, it is relatively easy to level criticisms such as these, and it is 
Martin (2001: 202) who rightly argues that the ‘difficult part is suggesting what needs 
to be done’ and ‘how we should move forward’.  
While rightly stressing the rigour required between concepts and evidence, 
Markusen’s techniques are overly simplistic and somewhat backward. Arguing that 
because our research results are shared among a community of researchers and 
practitioners, Markusen calls for empirical tests that sample whether important 
concepts are understood and deployed methodologically in more of less the same 
way. To take her own example, Markusen argues that by asking the question over and 
over, ‘how do we know it when we see it?’ we can create a checklist of regional 
characteristics such that if a number of regions possess these capabilities – be they 
institutional, organisational, networked, agency-based, structural, and so on – then we 
can associate them with a measure of success. While it would be a reasonable 
diagnosis to suggest that this approach embrace the reality that policy emulation 
becomes part of the orthodoxy of practice, deploying the language of Lovering 
(1999), the ‘policy tail is wagging the methodological dog’ here. 
On the face of it, it appears Markusen is advocating that we take a 
generational step back to our positivist ancestry in seeking generic (apolitical) spatial 
models. While Markusen promotes this approach as offering ‘original 
conceptualisations’ of ‘characteristics that could be unequivocally posited in the same 
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way by all readers’ which ‘meets the demands of sound academic research’ (ibid: 
870), bearing in mind the inherent lines of weakness detailed in this paper these 
proposals do nothing to alleviate these problems. 
Following the methodological lines of argument surrounding Markusen’s 
(1999) paper, I want to forward the claim that there should be a place within critical 
regional studies for single-region intensive case-study research, although one based 
upon the complex ideas that multiple modes of policy legitimation are acting through 
the regional state apparatus of the reconstituted capitalist space economy (i.e. one that 
can reconstruct the new regionalism, rather than purely deconstructing as was the case 
with Lovering). Drawing on recent arguments (Peck, 2003; Bristow, 2005), I want to 
forward the argument for undertaking empirically grounded place-specific new 
regionalist case studies that offer the capacity to allow one to analyse the 
multidimensional policy trajectories and multiscalar linkages (and interlinkages) 
occurring in and through regions. 
In response to Markusen’s evocative commentary, I believe that Peck was 
justified in dragging her arguments back from the brink of advocating singular 
methodologies based on traditional forms of quantification; which had became an 
increasing fallacy and distraction to her original argument. Where Peck’s work gains 
currency with my thoughts in this paper is his recognition that case-study research can 
be extended as long as the challenge is met “to develop rigorous research designs and 
validity checks, to set the bar high in terms of standards of corroboration and 
triangulation, in a fashion that is consistent with the methods and modes that are being 
employed” (Peck, 2003: 736). Furthermore, in a thought-provoking paper – that seeks 
to problematise the discourse of regional competitiveness – Bristow (2005: 296) 
argues that:  
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“What is missing is any effort to conceptualise regions as territorially defined 
social aggregations, with very different economic and political 
structures…[Moreover] more empirical research is needed to understand and 
identify the conditions which enable some regions to adapt successfully, 
whilst others remain ‘locked-in’ to a fatal development path” 
 
Bearing in mind the inherent lines of weakness in the new regionalism, and 
seeking to build upon Peck’s methodological challenge, it is here that I want to begin 
the reconstruction of a framework which addresses how we can go about doing 
regional regulation.  
To briefly look at one example where this extended empircally grounded case-
study research may be appropriate, while it is now widely accepted that England is 
seeking a greater engagement in policies aimed at increasing institutional capacity 
through a regional institutional framework, critics believe that a ‘thin’ approach is 
being adopted, whereby politicians are rescaling rather than resolving the economic 
and democratic deficit (Jones, 2001; Jones and MacLeod, 1999). Bound-up within 
this, is the concern that deep contradictions exist around normative concerns in New 
Labour’s policy: (i) that there is a necessary link between economic competitiveness 
and the regional scale; (ii) that there is a necessary link between regions and increased 
social participation and stakeholder democracy; (iii) that all the English regions can 
benefit from sub-national frameworks and supports and improve their regional 
economic competitiveness; and (iv) that both 1 and 2 can be secured through 
institutional organisations such as development agencies.  
By exploring a number of different policy strands operating through place, I 
believe that an intensive research project could be used here to look at a single case-
study region in order to provide a greater understanding of England’s new 
regionalism, in its various roles as the incubator of knowledge, learning, and 
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economic growth. As briefly alluded to earlier in the paper, this cannot be achieved 
through some of the ‘chaotic conceptions’ or ‘bad abstractions’ that “arbitrarily 
divides the indivisible and/or lumps together the unrelated and the inessential, thereby 
‘carving up’ the object of study with little or no regard for its structure and form” 
(Sayer, 1992: 138). Critically, while there may be different forms of new regionalism 
(concept), single-region case studies are important because there can be no variants to 
a single identified region (real place)7. Moreover, through rational abstractions which 
both embed single region case studies, and then make the connections between 
different scales (Peck, 2003; Purcell, 2003), it is possible to advance the theoretical 
understandings of the new regionalism. This, it is argued, shows just one example of 
how critical regional geography could actually be engaging with the doing of regional 
regulation.  
 
5. Conclusion: Theoretical Insights and Policy Futures 
 The belief that dense networks are expected to show better than average 
growth performances has given hope to those less favoured regions who see this as an 
opportunity for innovation and competitive advantage that is not based on material, 
path-dependent factors such as industrial capital. Unfortunately in recent years, many 
of the regional growth economies that the new regionalism has exposed to such 
intense empirical research and theoretical speculation have been experiencing a year-
on-year decline in their respective growth rates.  
The major issue facing the new regionalism today is the need to consider the 
region in relation to its interconnectedness with other scales and other sites of 
economic organisation. New regionalist analysis has been overly obsessed with its 
                                                          
7 Peck (2003: 736) utilises this structure to argue that while there may be different forms of world city 
(concept) there can be no variants of New York City (real place). 
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own belief that the region had somehow attained a new authority in and of itself. This 
belief in its own press has slowly been shaken (for the better) not only by Lovering, 
but also by a new generation of theorists who, building on their own particular history 
of interest with the state, have sought to highlight how the rise of the regional scale is 
deeply intertwined with the restructuring of the state (Jones, 2001; Jones and 
MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a; 1999b; Goodwin et al., 2005). 
 The nation-state will remain an important arena for promoting and regulating 
social and spatial cohesion, but the traditional hierarchy with the nation-state at the 
apex is being modified because although change at the bottom is no longer expected 
to come about through change at the top, change at the top is called for to consolidate 
and develop the achievements at the bottom (Lipietz, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 
1998). Critically, if economic development strategies are to be rendered more 
effective, there needs to be a greater transparency between the state, the region, and 
localities. This has led Jessop to highlight that if and when this situation occurs, the 
state’s role will tend towards being less hierarchical, less centralised and less dirigiste 
in character (Jessop, 2002).  
 As one last reminder of the importance of the state in the future of the new 
regionalism, it is worth reiterating an interesting theory promoted by Cooke and 
Morgan (1998) towards their investigation into the knowledge and learning of the 
associational economy. It is strategically possible for the state to increase and build 
new capacity by actually doing less. In this way, the state becomes involved in the 
government of governance, or as Jessop identifies it, meta-governance or meta-
steering. This is critically important for actors engaged in new regionalist research 
because this is a strategy currently being adopted in countries like the United 
Kingdom with experimental policies of devolution and constitutional change 
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(Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and functional decentralisation whereby 
institutions such as the RDAs are being deployed as co-ordinators of coordination 
(England). The great danger of such a policy, however, is that the central state will 
simply undertake the first part of this strategy (doing less). It is into this arena that the 
new regionalism has a vital and fruitful future, and it is an opportunity that must not 
be missed. 
 In this paper I have also highlighted how the soft infrastructures that have 
characterised many of the regional growth economies are important, but they must be 
built into our theories rather than optimistically cast as solutions. New ideas have 
already begun transgressing into the work of regions in geography, through such 
publications as Amin et al’s (2003) report entitled Decentring the Nation. Rather than 
drawing down powers from London in the form of devolution – which it is argued has 
done little to alter the ‘spatial geometry’ of England – Amin et al. forward a radical 
proposal dispersing state and public institutions in equal shares throughout the nation. 
Whilst this proposal is currently constrained to an imagined reality, it’s theoretical 
foundation is thought-provoking in that it seeks to remedy the asymmetrical nature of 
power and responsibility bedevilling contemporary institutional arrangements for 
devolution to the English regions. Amin et al. argue that the dispersal of state and 
public institutions equally throughout the English regions will offer a radically new 
way of imagining the spatiality of the nation, with the promise of a multi-nodal rather 
than hierarchical nation, and a method for alleviating both regional economic and 
political inequality. 
In challenging existing urban theories, Amin and Thrift (2002) also present an 
alternative vision that is deeply rooted in post-structuralist, anti-essentialist and non-
representational theory to highlight how cities are formed through practices, mobility 
 41 
and experiences. Contained within this new reconceptualisation of cities, Amin and 
Thrift offer new scope to regional geographers in their reading of cities as sites replete 
of both formal and informal clustering through the incremental agglomeration and 
increasing density of light institutions. Although they deliberately seek to distance 
themselves from their earlier conceptual work on the thickening of softer institutions, 
this new work is actually the reworking and continuation of this older concept8. They 
have, however, made one important conceptual break over the past few years which 
has seen them distance themselves from the search for a territorial fix (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994) towards considering territory as relational (Amin and Thrift, 2002). 
Juxtaposed alongside Scott’s (2002) renditions surrounding the mosaic of global-city 
regions, the new regionalism has opportunities to engage with new theoretical 
readings of contemporary institutional ensembles. With the advent of institutional 
turns in political-economic geography: 
 
“Informal constraints matter. We need to know much more about culturally 
derived norms of behaviour and how they interact with formal rules to get 
better answers to such issues. We are just beginning the serious study of 
institutions.” (North, 1990: 140). 
 
Although it has been brought to attention that concepts such as social capital 
aren’t always deployed accurately, its place is relatively secure in the short term 
because it has come to serve as a useful mechanism for both academics and 
policymakers. In this sense, it is important that the new regionalism moves beyond 
what Lovering is prepared to accept, in order to steer a path away from the danger of 
stagnation. As we know, many of the relations and concepts that new regionalists 
                                                          
8 Despite this reworking of an earlier concept, Cities: Reimagining the Urban (Amin and Thrift, 2002) 
is noteworthy for its lack of engagement with the authors own work on institutionalisation, so much so 
that in the books entirety there is not a single reference to their pioneering work on institutionalisation 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994). 
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promote do indeed have inherent flaws, but bearing these in mind and not shelving 
their existence can still enable pertinent theoretical insights to avail from the pens of 
scholars prepared to engage in such debates. 
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